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1. The questions: If there is constitutional legislation, should it be 
interpreted in a different way from other legislation?  What would that 
mean in practice? 
 
In an earlier article, I argued that, if there is a special category of “constitutional” 
legislation in the UK, such legislation can be identified only by reference to one’s view 
of the essential function of a constitution.  This, I suggested, is to establish and regulate 
relations between institutions of the state.  I went on to pose, but not answer, a further 
question.  If there is constitutional legislation, should it be interpreted in a special way?1  
This article advances an answer: the techniques of interpretation appropriate for 
constitutional legislation are essentially the same as those used for any legislation, 
although the weights given to them may be different when the text and its interpreters 
have special roles.  Anyone who interprets or implements any legislation must ensure 
that they act in ways which are legally acceptable and practically workable .  That is 
particularly important when the legislation affects the functions and working of state 
institutions.  Decisions about the meaning and effect of legislation must be in 
accordance with constitutional principles (unless the legislation is clearly designed to 
alter them).   
Yet constitutional principles are not necessarily consistent with each other, and 
tensions between them may pull interpreters in different directions.  In the UK, for 
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example, there are common-law presumptions on one side: that the Queen in 
Parliament is presumed not to intend to legislate inconsistently with the UK’s 
international legal obligations; that the Queen in Parliament is not to be taken to intend 
to interfere with individuals’ rights and freedoms or impose criminal liability except by 
clear words; that some rights are fundamental, and assumed to be especially dear to the 
Queen in Parliament; that the Queen in Parliament is to be assumed to understand and 
respect the need for a fair adjudicative procedure, and equality of all subjects of the 
Crown before the law; and so on.  By and large, these rebuttable presumptions are 
liberal in their orientation.  On the other side are constitutional ideas which are more 
paternalistic and authoritarian: the state’s top priority is the safety of the  population; 
judges should defer to the judgment of Parliament; judges should not interpret 
legislation (even criminal legislation) in such a way as to produce a result different from 
that for which Parliament hoped, regardless of the ordinary meaning of the statute.  
We regularly experience the tension between such norms.  For example, if the 
legislature passes first a statute predominantly concerned with the protection of rights, 
and then one which limits rights to prevent terrorism, the executive is likely to ask 
courts to interpret the earlier legislation restrictively in the light of the later.  If judges 
regard the earlier legislation as having constitutional status, however, they will 
interpret the later legislation as not repealing or limiting it unless it does so 
unambiguously.  But how should we interpret the earlier, constitutional legislation?  
Should we use techniques differently from those we use on “ordinary” legislation?  
From one perspective, constitutional legislation promulgates law-generating norms in 
the same way as other legislation.  On the other hand, the fact that constitutional 
legislation deals with the structure of the state, rather than the obligations of its citizens 
and others, might be thought to make a special interpretative approach necessary.  
Professor Aharon Barak, formerly President of the Supreme Court of Israel, 
encapsulates the dilemma when writes, “A constitution is a legal text that grounds a 
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legal norm.  As such, it should be interpreted like any other legal text.”2  The general 
principle, then, is that constitutional legislation is to be interpreted in accordance with the same 
considerations as other legislation.  Nevertheless, its constitutional context may have a 
significant effect on the result.  As the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom wrote in Imperial 
Tobacco Ltd v. Lord Advocate, rules contained in the Scotland Act 1998 “must be interpreted 
in the same way as any other rules that are found in a UK statute”.3 Lord Hope 
reaffirmed this, with the agreement of the other Justices of the Supreme Court, in 
Attorney General v. National Assembly for Wales Commission in relation to the Government 
of Wales Act 2006.4   
Yet at the same time, as Professor Barak points out:5 
“…a constitution sits at the top of the normative pyramid.  It shapes the 
character of society and its aspirations throughout history.  It establishes a 
nation’s basic political points of view.  It lays the foundation for social values, 
setting goals, obligations, and trends.  It is designed to guide human 
behaviour over an extended period of time, establishing the framework for 
enacting legislation6 and managing the national government.7  It reflects the 
events of the past, lays a foundation for the present, and shapes the future.  It 
is at once philosophy, politics, sociology, and law.  The unique characteristics 
of a constitution warrant a special approach to its interpretation,8 because ‘it 
is a constitution we are expounding.”9 
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Can we explain or reconcile these apparently contradictory intuitions?  In the 
Imperial Tobacco case, the Supreme Court attempted to do by pointing out that the rules 
in the Scotland Act– 
“...must, of course, be taken to have been intended to create a system for 
the exercise of legislative power by the Scottish Parliament that was 
coherent, stable and workable. This is a factor that it is proper to have in 
mind. But it is not a principle of construction that is peculiar to the 1998 
Act. It is a factor that is common to any other statute that has been 
enacted by the legislature, whether at Westminster or at Holyrood. ... 
[T]he description of the Act as a constitutional statute cannot be taken, 
in itself, to be a guide to its interpretation. The statute must be 
interpreted like any other statute. But the purpose of the Act has 
informed the statutory language. ... That purpose provides the context 
for any discussion about legislative competence.”10 
In Attorney General v. National Assembly for Wales Commission, Lord Hope repeated 
that the description of an Act as a constitutional statute cannot, in itself, be a guide to its 
interpretation.  “The rules which the court must apply in order to give effect to it are 
those laid down by the statute, and the statute must be interpreted like any other 
statute.  But the purpose of the Act has informed the statutory language, and it is proper 
to have regard to it if help is needed as to what the words mean.”11   
It is difficult to understand this in the abstract.  To build up a sense of what it 
means in practice, we need to start by seeing whether we can identify how ‘any other 
statute’ is interpreted, and try, along the way, to make the discussion more concrete.  
We can start from an uncontroversial proposition.  Generally, it is proper to focus first 
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on the words of a provision and require decisions (of all kinds of institutions) to be 
justifiable by reference to, or at least not inconsistent with, a reasonable reading of the 
words in their context.  Initially, at any rate, only the words carry authority.  There are 
reasons, however, for moving beyond the ordinary or literal meaning of a legal text, and 
these reasons may be particularly relevant when dealing with constitutional legislation.   
As constitutions mature, the meaning or understanding of the text becomes 
increasingly complex.  The words inevitably become overlaid with a mass of other 
words through the work of glossators, interpreters, legislators, administrators, and 
adjudicators.  By weaving together threads of meaning from different sources, we make 
constitutional provisions increasingly richly textured.  The text remains an important 
strand, but the time may come when current understanding and implementation of 
parts of the constitution are hard to explain or justify in terms of the text.  The 
provisions in the Article II of the Constitution of the USA governing the election of the 
President are a notable example of that kind.  The text has been overlaid by conventions 
generated from contesting the original understanding of the kind of democracy that the 
USA was to be.  In addition, when a particular institution is regarded as having power 
to determine authoritatively the way in which a text is to be understood and applied, its 
decisions may drive the effect of the constitution from the ordinary meaning of its text.  
The Constitution of the USA again offers an example: the jurisprudence of federal 
courts, especially the Supreme Court, is as important as the text for understanding what 
the Constitutions “means”.  The Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as interpreted by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) is another example.  
How, then, can one pin down the elements of constitutional interpretation?  This 
article adopts a two-stage strategy.  The first stage is to remind ourselves of the basic 
saws concerning statutory interpretation.  The second is to consider whether different 
principles or maxims apply to constitutional legislation, whether codified or not.  We 
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might then be able to draw some conclusions about interpreting constitutionally 
significant legislation of the kind one finds in the UK 
 
2. General approaches to statutory interpretation 
“The general approach to statutory interpretation is today not in doubt.”12  In R. 
(Quintaville) v. Secretary of State for Health Lord Bingham said:13 
“The basic task of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the true 
meaning of what Parliament has said in the enactment to be construed.  
But that is not to say that attention should be confined and a literal 
interpretation given to the particular provisions which give rise to 
difficulty.  Such an approach…may…(under the banner of loyalty to the 
will of Parliament) lead to the frustration of that will, because undue 
concentration on the minutiae of the enactment may lead the court to 
neglect the purpose which Parliament intended to achieve when it 
enacted the statute.  Every statute other than a pure consolidating 
statute is, after all, enacted to make some change, or address some 
problem, or remove some blemish, or effect some improvement in the 
national life.  The court’s task, within the permissible bounds of 
interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament’s purpose.  So the 
controversial provisions should be read in the context of the statute as a 
whole, and the statute as a whole should be read in the historical 
context of the situation which led to its enactment.” 
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As this passage makes clear, there are different approaches to interpreting statutes.  
They include “literal (or ordinary, or natural) meaning”, “true meaning”, “legislative 
intention”, and “mischief” approaches.  These are not totally distinct, much less 
mutually exclusive; they run together, and interpreters either choose between them or 
(like Lord Bingham) treat intention and mischief as techniques for establishing the “true 
meaning” of the statutory text.  They have significant limitations in practice.  For 
example, there can be no single literal, ordinary, natural or true meaning of a provision 
if it operates and is expressed in two languages simultaneously.  Multilingual 
instruments are the norm in many legal systems (such as that of Canada) and 
international treaties (such as the European Convention on Human Rights), in each of 
which the French and English texts are equally authoritative.14  There is also the so-
called ‘golden rule’: statutes are normally to be given their ordinary, or natural, 
meaning, but we may depart from that meaning if it would produce an absurd result.  
The important point about the ‘golden rule’ is that, unlike the true (or natural) meaning, 
legislative intention and mischief approaches, it explicitly places responsibility on the 
interpreter to place limits on the acceptable outcomes of applying the legislation to 
particular sets of facts.  It is not self-evident when a result is absurd.  Interpreters must 
make a judgement in the light of their expectations of the legal system (including an 
interpretative presumption that legislation is not passed to achieve absurd and arbitrary 
results) and underpinning constitutional principles, bearing in mind the mischief at 
which the legislation is aimed, but ultimately relying on interpreters to decide when, 
exceptionally, an outcome is so odd or arbitrary as to be unacceptable in a society 
governed by the rule of law. 
The “legislative intention” approach is conceptually the most difficult.  It may 
refer to an objective, disembodied, imputed intention, that intention which a reasonably 
well informed person reading the text would imagine that the legislator had.  It may 
alternatively refer to an actual, subjective intention of a real legislator.  The latter suffers 
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from problems.  The legislator might not have any subjective intention.  An autocrat 
with legislative power can intend his or her legislation to have a particular meaning or 
effect.  A collective, institutional legislator (or “legislature”), by contrast, can have no 
such subjective intention.  A unicameral legislature, such as the New Zealand 
Parliament, can be imagined as “intending”to pass a Bill; this is implied from its 
members having collectively followed the procedural rules governing the passing of 
Bills.  Constitutional rules specify a series of actions, the product of which is officially 
taken to be a piece of legislation.  Members and officers of the legislature accept this; it 
is one of the rules of the game which they play together.  (Similarly, legal rules 
regularly specify how to establish the “will” of other corporate bodies which the law 
regards as capable of legal agency.)  Professor John Gardner distinguishes between 
natural concerted agency (“teamwork”), such as an orchestra playing together to 
perform a symphony or a football team playing in a match, and artificial concerted 
agency, or vicarious agency, which depends on norms which allow certain people to act 
as representatives of the collectivity.15  In an orchestra, no one musician’s idea of the 
desired interpretation of the music is decisive; the interpretation is a result of the 
combination of individual, creative (or re-creative) performances.  By contrast, in a 
company the law may allow the subjective intention of an officer of the company to be 
decisive as to the “intention” of the company.   
Professor Gardner suggests that a legislature relies on a mixture of natural and 
artificial concerted agency.  We can unpack this a little.  In political institutions, where 
co-operation and unity of purpose are less common than in an orchestral performance 
or a single football team, the legislative process is more like a competition between at 
least two teams, working against each other within a framework of accepted rules, and 
recognizing as valid whatever result flows from playing the game.  The teams all intend 
to produce a result (legislation), although there is no necessary agreement as to what 
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the legislation means or what effect it is to have.  It is only in this very minimal sense, as 
Professor Joseph Raz shows, that one can accept the outcome of a legislative process as 
being intended collectively by the legislature: the members of the legislature intend to 
legislate, but need not have any understanding of the content or import of the 
legislation they are enacting.16 
It follows that the legislature cannot institutionally have an intention as to what a 
Bill is to mean when it becomes an Act (unless, at any rate, there is convincing evidence 
that the members of the institution were unanimous as to their reasons for and 
objectives in adopting the text of the legislation).  In normal circumstances, the intention 
of a legislature is either logically very minimal—to pass a Bill—or empirically obscure, 
or both.17  If a legislature is comprised of a multiplicity of institutions, such as the Queen 
in Parliament in the UK (consisting of the monarch, House of Lords, and House of 
Commons) or the US Congress (consisting of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate), the idea that they can have a collective intention in relation to a particular Bill 
(beyond the intention to pass the Bill) piles absurdity on obscurity.   
Dr Richard Ekins, who has done more than most to rescue the idea of legislative 
intent from its problems, has concluded that the legislative intent “is to change the law 
in the complex, reasoned way set out in the open proposal for legislative action”.18  
However, even he does not make it clear how this relates to the task of an interpreter of 
the legislation.  He suggests that an interpreter “should aim to understand the 
legislature’s intended meaning” and also “the reasoned choice that finds expression in 
this intended meaning”.19  This is metaphysically comprehensible, but how far is an 
interpreter to go, beyond reading the statute as a whole, to work out the “intended 
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meaning”?  Ekins’s examples seem to me to show that one can explain earlier 
interpretative decisions of courts as turning on a search for an intended meaning, but 
they do not explain how a court approaching a problem without the benefit of already 
knowing what it will decide would find the intended meaning, beyond advancing a 
number of techniques or maxims of interpretation which seem only questionably 
related to legislative intent.  Professor Neil Duxbury also advocates courts’ using a 
notion of legislative intention when interpreting legislation.  He argues for the reality of 
such intention, though accepting that it may be extremely difficult to unearth, because 
behaving as if there were such an intention provides interpretative discipline and limits 
the risk that judges will act as unconstrained legislators through uncontrolled 
interpretation.20  But, as Maksymilian Del Mar observes in a sympathetically critical 
review of Ekins’s and Duxbury’s books, this does not require (or, one may add, 
establish) that legislative intent in relation to the meaning of particular pieces of 
legislation is real; “all it requires is a presupposition or supposition of a legislature 
acting reasonably to produce a reasonably coherent text”.21 
Even if, contrary to my view, one were to accept that an institutional legislature 
can have an intention as to the detailed meaning and effect of its legislation, there are 
further difficulties for interpreters in using legislative intention as a basis for statutory 
interpretation.  For example, whose intentions and which of their intentions are to 
count, and how are they to be discovered?22  What wider assumptions should be 
brought to bear when trying to establish intentions?  If a legislature has an intention as 
to the detailed meaning and effect of legislation, it is fair to assume that the legislation 
will have been drafted so as to produce that effect, and that the drafters (and legislators) 
will have done their work in the light of an understanding of the interpretative 
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conventions which interpreters are likely to apply to the text.23  These conventions, as 
Professor Max Radin observed, are developed on the assumption that the purpose of all 
law is to advance, so far as possible, justice and security.  Statutes also form part of a 
principled, intellectual system of laws which are concerned generally with fairly diffuse 
notions of justice and which seek to maintain a degree of internal coherence.24  Once 
interpreters accept that there are times when it is desirable for these general 
considerations to give legislation more than the narrowest possible meaning, they have 
to choose between degrees of latitude.25  Professor Gardner has argued that it is possible 
for a legislature to take account of the various degrees of interpretative latitude which 
may be available when deciding how narrowly to cast the range of possible cases to 
which the legislation is applicable or of outcomes which it may produce.  If interpreters 
approach legislation on the assumption that it was intended to be subject to the normal 
range of possible degrees of inclusiveness unless the legislation itself narrows down 
that range, the pursuit of legislative intention becomes circular.26 
The “purpose” of legislation is also problematic.  As Professor Radin showed, the 
range of purposes which members of a legislature have in relation to legislation, even if 
they acquiesced in its passing, is great.  They are likely to include wanting to be viewed 
favourably by constituents or by party leaders, wanting to be seen to do something 
while leaving it to courts to decide how what they are doing should have effect, and 
wanting to achieve a general aim (such as being tough on crime).27  Legislators will 
often not think too hard, or at all, about how the legislation they make will affect people 
in the often very wide variety of circumstances in which it might be invoked.  
Interpreters who seek the purpose of legislation must therefore choose between possible 
purposes at different levels of generality and public-spiritedness. 
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By ‘intention (or purpose) of Parliament’, then, we mean the intention which it 
seems to us (as interpreters) to be rational to attribute to the institutional legislator in 
the circumstances.  As Lord Carswell said in R. v. Z (Attorney General for Northern 
Ireland’s Reference): 
“If the words of a statutory provision, when construed in a literalist 
fashion, produce a meaning which is manifestly contrary to the 
intention which one may readily impute to Parliament, when having 
regard to the historical context and the mischief, then it is not merely 
legitimate but desirable that they should be construed in the light of the 
purpose of the legislature in enacting the provision.”28  
In R. (M.) v. Hackney L.B.C., Toulson L.J., after referring to judicial statements from a 
number of jurisdictions, concluded: 
“As these citations show, there is a tendency for the courts to express 
their conclusions by reference to the imputed intention of the 
legislature.  This is valuable in so far as it concentrates the mind of the 
court on the purpose of the particular statutory provision in the wider 
statutory scheme, although beyond that it can be an oratorical device 
for clothing the judge’s view of the seriousness of the non-compliance 
on the particular facts with the mantle of the hypothetical view of the 
legislature.”29 
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Interpreters seeking a sensible, workable outcome to a dispute that is consistent 
with a legislative text choose methods of interpretation in the light of constitutional 
principles, including prohibition of arbitrariness (sometimes called the “principle of 
legality” or, more descriptively, “quality of law”).30 These constitutional principles are 
reflected in interpretative presumptions, “which are not easily displaced by a statutory 
text”.31 
If the statute is to have legal effects, the purpose attributed to it must fit into the 
surrounding law and seem reasonable to members of the interpretative community, not 
(or not only) to the political or legislative community.  As Professor Sir John Baker has 
shown, laws operate primarily in the interpretative community of the legal profession 
and judiciary.  The range of acceptable meanings is shaped by the “common learning” 
of that community: the largely orally transmitted tradition; values; and system of 
education.  These operate socially, depending more on shared, often unarticulated 
assumptions than on statutes and case-law.32 The late Professor Brian Simpson made a 
similar point when describing the common law as a kind of customary law, and 
criticizing positivists for failing to account for this central characteristic.33 Working out 
the meaning of a law is a legal and social process, involving a search for professional 
consensus.  It is not a psychological inquiry into the motivation of politicians. 
Nevertheless, this view is contested.  Professor Jeffrey Goldsworthy argues that, 
without some idea of statutory intention, the meaning of a statute becomes merely the 
conventional, semantic meaning of the words used, without purpose.  This, he claims, 
would reduce statutes to random collections of letters, akin to the product of an infinite 
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number of monkeys at keyboards, a result of chance rather than intelligent design.34 As 
Goldsworthy recognizes, one may accept that some group or groups of people in the 
legislative process must have an intention or purpose in seeking the enactment of the 
statute, yet deny that their intention or intentions can be identified with an intention of 
the legislature as a whole.  But he responds that it would be bizarre to treat actual 
statutes in that way.  People interpreting a statute assume that it is trying to achieve 
something, and that they have to work out what it is.  When judges adopt a non-literal 
meaning in order to give effect to the presumed purpose of the legislation, their conduct 
is legitimate only if they remain the legislator’s “faithful agents” by justifying their 
conclusion by reference to the assumed intention of the legislator.   Without that, he 
says, judges would effectively enjoy supremacy over statute law.   
One can, however, rationally (albeit somewhat artificially) regard the Queen in 
Parliament as “intending” to pass the Bill into law, yet deny that the Queen in 
Parliament had a collective intention as to its effect and operation.  An Act of 
Parliament derives its authority from its enactment by the Queen in Parliament, a 
complex institution of formed of several institutions, but one which can conveniently be 
imagined as having “intended” to go through the stages of the process that leads to the 
making of an Act of Parliament.  Duly completing that process gives the Act its legal 
authority.  But its meaning is created by human beings—those who read it as much as 
those who draft it, and more than those who enact it.  The legislative process confers 
legal authority on the text, making it a source of law by reference to which, when it is 
relevant, people (including but not only judges) must be able to justify their actions and 
decisions in order to stay within the law.  Goldsworthy’s argument conflates and 
confuses the source of a statute’s authority and the source of its meaning.  It is not 
necessary to assume that the Queen in Parliament has an intention as to how the text 
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should be interpreted and given effect in all (or any) circumstances, still less that the 
legislative process confers binding, legal authority on any of the many discrete and 
varied meanings of the text (or intentions of the drafters, promoters and supporters and 
opponents of the Bill).  Nor do their intentions or purposes confer legal authority on the 
resulting Act.  Only its emergence from the completed legislative process can do that.   
Why, then, do people regularly confuse the source of authority of a piece of 
legislation with the source of its meaning?  It seems that there is a desire, stemming 
from their adoption of both a particular idea of democracy and a particular view of the 
place of legislative sovereignty in the constitution, to confer parliamentary legitimacy 
not only on the legislation but on a particular meaning of the legislation.  If a person 
considers that democracy is a fundamental constitutional principle in one’s state, and 
that democracy requires that laws be made by a body whose members are elected by or 
accountable to an electorate, it is not surprising that he or she gives considerable weight 
to the ways in which individual members of a legislature exercise their functions.  If in 
addition the legislature in question is the highest domestic source of law in the state, it 
is understandable that one would regard law-making by other bodies as having lesser 
authority.  In the UK, where some people are strongly attached to a peculiarly extreme 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, these considerations might explain their desire 
to find parliamentary authority for as much of the law as possible.  This, however, 
cannot justify the claim that only the notion of “parliamentary intention” can confer 
legitimacy on an interpretation of legislation.  The authority of a statutory provision 
stems from its inclusion in a statute which has survived the hurdles of legislative 
procedure.  The authority of a meaning arises from that meaning’s adoption by an 
authoritative interpreter, or, as some would say, an authoritative voice in the relevant 
interpretative community. 
That is a conceptual argument.  Even those who do not accept it, and want to find 
the legislature’s “intention”, will, however, find the method of statutory drafting in the 
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United Kingdom calculatedly unhelpful.  Statutes usually carry on their faces no 
indication of the mischief at which they are aimed; they do not tell a story.  Looking at 
the statute as a whole will not always help: many statutes are collections of knee-jerk 
reactions to a number of different stimuli, and the degree of coherence is further 
reduced where changes in government policy are given effect by amending earlier 
legislation drafted to give effect to different policies.  This has been a particular problem 
in the field of criminal law, procedure and sentencing, and is made worse by the maze 
of commencement orders and transitional provisions which this legislative flood has 
necessitated.35  Such statutes lose, through these accretions, any coherence of purpose 
which they might originally have had.  To navigate to sensible solutions, bold 
interpretative steps are needed, using the proviso to the “golden rule”: if the natural or 
literal meaning of a provision would produce an absurd result, interpreters may depart 
from it.  A purposive approach of some kind may be useful when deciding both 
whether a result is absurd and what result would be sensible.  But the purpose to be 
sought has to be that of the draftsman (who is assumed to have understood what was 
being done, but whose true thoughts are unknown) or of a sensible, all-foreseeing 
legislature, rather than that of the Queen in Parliament, which, even if it is assumed to 
be capable of reflective thought, can safely be assumed not to have understood the 
provisions, or not to have foreseen the problem, or both. 
When a question of interpretation arises in the course of litigation, it is problematic 
because the court has to deal with it in order to answer the question, “Who wins?”  The 
problem may take one of several forms.  Sometimes, the legislative text (often as 
amended at least once), on a technical or ordinary reading, simply offers no answer to 
that question, because it appears meaningless in the context of the facts of the case.  
Sometimes, the text provides a straightforward answer, but judges consider that it 
would be absurd or unfair to one party or both parties, or that it would not fit 
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 See, e.g. J. R. Spencer, ‘The drafting of criminal legislation: need it be so impenetrable?’ [2008] C.L.J. 585-
605. 
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comfortably into the legal framework in which it has to operate.  In this situation, they 
may construct an alternative meaning which achieves what they regard as a fair result.  
Occasionally, the text provides two possible answers (for example, one giving words 
their technical meaning and the other their ordinary meaning), and the court has to 
decide which to choose.  For example, in Edwards v. Attorney General for Canada36 the 
Governor General of Canada referred to the Supreme Court of Canada a question as to 
whether the word “persons” in section 24 of the British North America Act 1867 
included women, so that women would be eligible for election to the Canadian Senate.  
In its general sense, “persons” clearly included women.  The Supreme Court advised, 
however, that it meant “men”, as (according to a majority) it had to be read in the light 
of the historic common-law disability of women to hold public office.  On appeal, the 
Privy Council reversed the decision, holding that one had to look at the word in the 
context in which it appeared, namely as part of a constitutional code governing the 
institutions of Canada, and in that context there was no need, historically or textually, to 
adopt a presumption against women’s capacity to hold public office or to be eligible for 
election.   
Some cases combine elements of several of those situations, as the following 
examples show. 
In In re Maryon-Wilson’s Will Trusts,37 a testator, who died in 1897, had left legacies 
subject to several life interests in his estate, and required devisees and legatees under 
his will (rather than his executors) to bear the estate duty “on my death payable on or in 
respect of any devises legacies or bequests made by me”.  At that time, estate duty 
(which the testator regarded as an “unjust and ruinous” tax, and which he hoped would 
be abandoned) was levied at the rate of 7½ per cent.  The Finance Act 1894, section 9(1), 
had provided that in such circumstances a rateable part of the estate duty payable in 
respect of a particular legacy would be a charge on the property used to pay the legacy.  
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 [1928] S.C.R. 276; SC of Canada; [1930] A.C. 124, PC. 
37
 [1968] Ch. 268. 
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Section 14(1) provided that a person who is authorised or required to pay the estate 
duty in respect of any property may recover the proper rateable amount of duty “from 
the person entitled to any sum charged on such property (whether as capital or as an 
annuity or otherwise) under a disposition not containing any express provision to the 
contrary”.  When the legacies came to be payable on the death of the second life tenant 
in 1965, the rate of estate duty had risen to 80 per cent.   
The trustees of the residuary estate sought a contribution from the legatees to the 
estate duty paid on the death of the first and second life tenants.  The legatees accepted 
that section 14(1) required them to contribute to the duty paid on the death of the 
second life tenant, on which they became entitled in possession to their legacies, at the 
rate of 80 per cent., reducing their value from £15,000 to £3,000; but they denied that 
they were liable to contribute to the duty paid on the death of the testator and the first 
life tenant, which would have reduced the value to £1,476, further benefiting the 
residuary beneficiaries of an estate which had grown in value since the testator’s death.  
Ungoed-Thomas J. had to decide whether “entitled to any sum charged on such 
property” meant “entitled at any time in the past or future” or had a more limited 
meaning.  He noted that “entitled” and “sum charged” are terms capable of having 
wide meanings, referring to contingent future interests, and asked whether the context 
in which the words were used affect that.38  He noted that even treating “entitled” as 
meaning “entitled in possession” would not avoid the problem, as a person could 
become entitled in possession in the future or the past.  In order to resolve the dispute, 
he had to add something to the bare words of the sub-section in order to make sense of 
it in the context of the case.39  But it had to be done with reference to the statute itself. 
“The court will not ascribe to Parliament an unjust intention, but the court 
cannot override Parliament and its statutes.  If the court is to avoid a 
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 [1968] Ch. at 281. 
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 In argument, W. S. Wigglesworth, counsel for the legatees, said that the main difference between himself and 
counsel for the residuary beneficiaries was “what had to be put in” to make the sub-section sensible: [1968] Ch. at 
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statutory result that flouts common sense and justice it must do so not by 
disregarding the   statute or overriding it, but by interpreting it in accordance 
with the judicially presumed parliamentary concern for common sense and 
justice.”40 
He resolved his dilemma by focusing on the opening words of the sub-section, “In 
the case of property which does not pass to the executor as such…”.  They showed, he 
concluded, that the statute was dealing with property passing on a particular death, 
and with people who have paid the estate duty due on that death.  That person is then 
entitled to contribution from a person entitled to any sum charged on the property.  
“…I read ‘property’ as the sum charged on that property, not in the sense of a sum 
contingently payable and secured by a charge, but in the sense which appears to me to 
be the more natural and popular sense, of an existing sum actually and presently 
payable and secured by a charge on the property when it passes on the death; and 
‘entitled to any sum’ as meaning entitled in possession to payment of the sum so 
charged”.41 
When Ungoed-Thomas J. referred to “the more natural and popular sense” of the 
words, it should not be confused with giving them their ordinary or natural meaning.  
They were technical words with a technical meaning, and his Lordship was trying to 
find a reading of them which would not almost halve the value of legacies which had 
already been reduced to one-fifth of the face value of the original bequests, while 
benefiting the residuary beneficiaries who were already extremely well provided for.  A 
fair result in this case (meaning fair as between the parties) meant limiting as far as 
possible the unfairness flowing from the testator’s decision to make the legatees 
contribute to the estate duty, a decision made when the duty was charged at 7½ per 
cent., and not foreseeing that it would later reach 80 per cent.  Where the legislative text 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
276. 
40
 [1968] Ch. at 282. 
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 [1968] Ch. at 283. 
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is unhelpful, necessity becomes the mother of interpretative invention, whether or not 
the outcome is clothed in the language of an assumed parliamentary intention. 
For another example of a case of perceived unfairness in the face of taxation, 
leading to a deep division of opinion among Law Lords as to how to interpret or give 
effect to the legislation, consider Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioners,42 on section 
161(1) of the Income Tax Act 1952.  This made a company director liable to pay income 
tax on the value of money spent by the company where it “incurs expense in or in 
connection with the provision, for any of its directors…of living or other 
accommodation…or of other benefits or facilities or whatsoever nature…”  A majority 
decided that the words were not wide enough to make the director pay tax on the cost 
to the company of paying rates, feu duties, insurance, and (according to Lord Reid and 
Lord Pearce) doing repairs for a house which the company owned and allowed the 
director to rent from it.  Income tax being a tax on income, Lord Reid thought that any 
extension of the tax to sums which are not in any sense income would need to be 
expressed in clear statutory terms.  The purpose of s. 161(1) seemed on that basis to be 
to bring within tax provision made by a company for one of its directors which gives 
the director a financial benefit.  But s. 161(1) was “drafted in such a way that if its words 
are applied literally with their ordinary meanings they would include all the items with 
which this case is concerned”, whether they conferred a financial benefit on the director 
or not. 43   
“To apply the words literally is to defeat the obvious intention of the 
legislation and to produce a wholly unreasonable result.  To achieve the 
obvious intention and produce a reasonable result we must do some violence 
to the words. … It is only where the words are absolutely incapable of a 
construction which will accord with the apparent intention of the provision 
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 [1963] A.C. 557, HL. 
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 [1963] A.C. at 576 per Lord Reid. 
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and will avoid a wholly unreasonable result, that the words of the enactment 
must prevail.”44   
Lord Jenkins, dissenting, did not accept that there was any justification for such an 
interpretation; “the Act does not so provide”.  Lord Guest, approaching the legislation 
on the basis that “if possible, on a fair construction of the section, some mitigation must 
be found to the extreme results of the contentions for the Revenue.  I am, however, 
compelled, although most unwillingly, to agree that the expenditure charged in this 
case qualifies for inclusion as a perquisite under section 161(1)”.45 Neither was 
convinced that the “intention of the legislation”, if one existed, could be shown to be 
different from the effect of the text. 
Lest it be objected that both those cases concerned tax legislation, where the 
purpose of the legislation (beyond raising revenue on a more or less fair basis) is 
particularly hard to fathom, let us take one more example from the law of mortgages.  
In Western Bank Ltd v. Schindler,46 a mortgagor had mortgaged his dwelling house to the 
bank.  The capital was repayable after ten years, and interest was payable monthly in 
advance.  The mortgagor took out an endowment policy, intended to cover the capital, 
maturing after ten years, and assigned it to the bank.  The mortgagor stopped paying 
the interest and the monthly premiums after three months.  The bank applied for 
possession, without foreclosing on the mortgage.  The mortgagor asked the court to 
exercise discretion under section 36 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970 to delay 
exercise of the mortgagee’s right to possession.  That section provided, so far as 
relevant, as follows: 
“(1) …the court may exercise any of the powers conferred on it by subsection 
(2) below if it appears to the court that in the event of its exercising the power 
the mortgagor is likely to be able within a reasonable period to pay any sums 
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 [1963] A.C. at 577. 
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 [1963] A.C. at 584 per Lord Jenkins and 586 per Lord Guest. 
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 [1968] Ch. 1, CA. 
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due under the mortgage or to remedy a default consisting of a breach of any 
other obligation arising under or by virtue of the mortgage. 
“(2) The court—…(b) on giving judgment, or making an order, for delivery of 
possession of the mortgaged property, or at any time before the execution of 
such judgment or order, may—(i) stay or suspend execution of the judgment 
or order, or (ii) postpone the date for delivery of possession, for such period 
or periods as the court thinks reasonable. …” 
The problem was that the interest payments and premiums due under the endowment 
policy were not “sums due under the mortgage”, and the obligations to make those 
payments were not “obligations arising under or by virtue of the mortgage”.  The sums 
were due, and obligations to pay them arose, under agreements collateral to the 
mortgage.  The mortgagee bank argued that section 36 was therefore inapplicable, and 
the court had no discretion to delay its taking possession of the house.  Buckley L.J. 
accepted that this was the literal meaning of the section, but thought that it led to a 
ridiculous result: the court would have discretion to delay a mortgagee’s possession if 
the mortgagor was in default, but not if the mortgagee was not in default.   
“I cannot believe that Parliament can have intended this irrational and unfair 
result.  I must therefore investigate whether the section is capable of some 
other construction. … The manifest unfairness, as I think, of such a position 
seems to me a strong ground for believing that it must have been 
Parliament’s intention to confer the power, default or no default, 
notwithstanding the ineptness of the language of the section to achieve this 
result.  The only part of the section which appears to contradict such an 
intention is the conditional clause.  This can only apply when the mortgagor 
is in arrear with some payment or is otherwise in default.  It would be very 
natural for Parliament to provide that, where the mortgagor is in arrear or 
otherwise in default, the discretionary power should not be used to prevent 
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the mortgagee from taking immediate possession unless the court were 
satisfied that there was a genuine likelihood of the mortgagor being able to 
put himself right within a reasonable time.  On this approach, the conditional 
clause operates as a restriction on the court’s free exercise of discretion.”47 
Scarman L.J. agreed.  To avoid absurdity, the court had to choose one of three 
options: (a) to treat this is a “casus omissus”, which only Parliament could fill; (b) to 
treat the section as excluding entirely the mortgagee’s common-law right to possession; 
(c) to give the court discretion to delay making an order for possession whatever the 
grounds on which the mortgagee is seeking it.  “The line between judicial legislation, 
which our law does not permit, and judicial interpretation in a way best designed to 
give effect to the intention of Parliament is not an easy one to draw.  Suffice it to say 
that before our courts can imply words into a statute the statutory intention must be 
plain and the insertion not too big, or too much at variance with the language in fact 
used by the legislature.”48  The court would strive to avoid option (a), but adopting 
option (b) would be to legislate.  Option (c) would strain the language of the section, but 
not, he thought, too far when it allowed the court “to give effect to what was plainly the 
intention of Parliament”.49 
Goff L.J., dissenting on this point, considered that there was no significant 
difference between option (b), which Scarman L.J. thought would go to far, and option 
(c), which also abrogated a mortgagee’s common-law right to possession, making it 
depend on a court’s exercise of discretion.  It was, in his view, not anomalous for section 
30 to provide merely that, if a mortgagor is in default, a court would have discretion to 
allow a reasonable time to make good the default.  There was no need to depart from 
the literal meaning of the section.50 
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Three noteworthy points emerge from these cases.51  First, save on extremely rare 
occasions when it makes no sense at all, it is not easy to decide whether a statutory 
text’s literal, or ordinary, meaning produces results which are unfair, absurd or 
unreasonable.  Much turns on judges’ views of what would be fair, sensible or 
reasonable.  Secondly, whether judges speak of the intention of the legislation, as in 
Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, or the intention of Parliament, as in Western Bank 
v. Schindler, the intention is constructed or imputed by judges, not immanent in the text.  
The judges admit that, when they speak of finding “the intention of Parliament”, they 
are looking for an interpretation which does as little violence as possible to the statutory 
language, produces what they regard as a sensible result, and is consistent with their 
view of the purpose of legislation (often adopted, as in Luke, on tenuous grounds, such 
as the idea that income tax must be presumed to be levied on what can sensibly be 
regarded as income).  Some forms of legislative drafting, especially where an Act has 
been amended by later Acts or changes introduced over a period have been brought 
together in a consolidation Act, can make it next to impossible to identify a purpose in a 
statutory text such as to allow a judge to decide who should win.  Where legislation has 
been amended, Parliamentary intention can hardly provide a guide, even if one believes 
in that phenomenon, as one would have to decide which Parliament’s intention was 
being sought.   Thirdly, to understand fully what judges say about statutory 
construction, one must read it in the light of the statute which they are examining, and 
the case which they are deciding.  It is tempting to sever statements about a court’s role 
in relation to statutes from their contexts, but that leaves out of account the fact that 
judges are always decision-makers, and only rarely political or linguistic philosophers.  
Their discussions of techniques of interpretation tell us as much about their ideas of 
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 And of course, there are many other examples, such as Maunsell v. Olins [1975] A.C. 373, HL, where there was a 
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fairness in relation to the facts of the case as about the task of making sense of statutes 
in the abstract.  As Professor Gardner wrote, the proper basis for selecting principles of 
interpretation for a particular case is that one principle or combination of principles 
leads to an “all-round better judicial decision”.52 
It seems, then, that “parliamentary intention”, so far as it is concerned with the 
meaning, rather than authority, of legislation, must be shorthand for the interpretation 
of legislation which the judge happens to find most helpful in a particular case.  Legal 
principles and doctrines can be developed in order to give judges the freedom to make 
those assessments.  For example, in administrative law there used to be an orthodox 
distinction drawn between “directory” and “mandatory” conditions for the exercise of a 
statutory power.  Breaching a mandatory condition made the resulting act invalid, but 
breach of a directory condition was not fatal to the act.  The distinction was similar to 
that between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors but, as Professor Stephen 
Bailey has pointed out, it states a conclusion as to the effect of non-compliance rather 
than criteria for reaching that conclusion.53  It has been said that “in each case you must 
look to the subject-matter; consider the importance of the provision that has been 
disregarded, and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be 
secured by the Act”,54 and that the effect on the rights of the subject on particular, 
concrete facts have to be considered, possibly leaving courts with a spectrum of possible 
outcomes, complete validity and total invalidity being at opposite ends of the spectrum.  
The modern approach is to look at the purpose of statutory procedures and “whether 
an intention should be attributed to the legislature that non-compliance with such 
procedures should render [the process] a nullity, irrespective whether it may have 
occasioned potential unfairness or prejudice”.55  As Professor Bailey puts it, “At one end 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
consequences let them to complicate the idea of “premises” considerably. 
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of the spectrum, flagrant non-compliance with a fundamental obligation may simply 
entitle the person affected to ignore the ensuing decision; at the other end, the defect in 
procedure may be so trivial that the authority can safely proceed.  In a great number of 
cases, possibly the majority, it will be necessary for the matter to be resolved by the 
courts.”56  The focus should be on the consequences of non-compliance, in which regard 
references to Parliament’s intention can obscure rather than illuminate the issues, as 
Toulson L.J. pointed out in the passage already noted.57 
If we discard the idea of parliamentary intention as to the meaning of legislation 
as more than a metaphor, how do we decide how to interpret legislation?  Contrary to 
the view of Professor Goldsworthy, it does not depend on judicial discretion or 
randomness.  Interpreters make choices in the light of constitutional principles which 
include that of non-arbitrariness, or as it is sometimes misleadingly called the “principle 
of legality”.58  This is particularly important in relation to constitutional legislation, 
affecting the structure and working of state institutions. 
3. Does constitutional legislation require special techniques of 
interpretation? 
As Professor Barak pointed out in the passage quoted earlier, a constitution “is at once 
philosophy, politics, sociology, and law”, not to mention history.  We must bear that in 
mind when we interpret it.59  Constitutions tell a story about the state, paint a picture of 
its unity, and try to stimulate loyalty to it.  The story and picture appear descriptive, but 
often present the state as the drafters would like it to be, not as it was and is.  
Descriptions are often aspirational prescriptions disguised as (often inaccurate) 
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historical or sociological assertions.  It would be dangerous for historians to take them 
too seriously as factual assertions, but the lasting quality of a constitution depends 
partly on how consistently citizens and officials view their history and the 
contemporary state through the prism of the constitution and accept historical 
distortion and exhortation as deep truth.  In this respect, constitutional provisions may 
be like parables, or morality tales.  Ordinary legislation is typically more prosaic and 
straightforwardly prescriptive, with more concrete and limited objectives, than a 
constitution. 
There is, however, no clear water between them.  In Israel, Basic Laws are 
procedurally and (apart from their name) formally just like ordinary laws passed by the 
Knesset.60 This need not be the case.  Some legislation, particularly constitutional 
legislation, shares some of the broader functions of constitutions.  Some constitutions 
are highly detailed and prescriptive, and lack rhetorical flourish.  For example, the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia is contained in an Act of the UK 
Parliament, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, which has no 
preamble; the long title is merely “An Act to constitute the Commonwealth of 
Australia”.  The Constitution itself begins prosaically, “The Constitution of the 
Commonwealth shall be as follows”.  This is an example of a constitution which takes 
its form and tone from the legislative tradition which produced it.  Even in more 
aspirational, codified constitutions particular provisions may be more like legislation 
than a typical constitution, tightly drafted to reflect a carefully negotiated compromise 
between political standpoints.  The Constitution of the Fifth Republic in France, which 
opens in an unmistakeably rhetorical, idealistic manner, has provisions about the 
process for enacting the budget which are of very detailed and prosaic.  Recognising 
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that, the Conseil constitutionnel strictly interprets these provisions, in contrast to its 
approach to (for example) the application of constitutional rights.61 
Constitutions and constitutional legislation thus both contain different kinds of 
provisions.  Whilst core constitutional rules shape the state institutions, and are 
paradigms of Hart’s secondary rules, not every rule found in a constitutional 
instrument is of that kind.  For example, a description of the national flag (e.g. in the 
2008 Constitution of the Maldives) is not a secondary rule, if indeed it can be described 
as a rule at all.  Nor need the provisions be consistent.  The contents of a constitutional 
document represent political choices.  A constituent body may decide to include various 
provisions which are symbolically or rhetorically important or are descriptive of the 
state or relate to the behaviour or rights of citizens rather than, or as well as, managing 
the structure and conduct of state institutions. 
Sometimes constitutional provisions are simply absent, because drafters failed to 
negotiate an agreement, so decided to leave an issue for politicians or judges to resolve 
later.  Perhaps the best known example of this is the silence of the Constitution of the 
USA. as to whether federal courts should have power to ensure that the Congress and 
the President do not exceed the boundaries of the powers allocated to them by the 
Constitution.  This is rare in ordinary legislation.  Even more unusual in ordinary 
legislation is the phenomenon whereby the way a constitutional text operates changes 
completely over a period of time, without any change in the text, on account of an 
overlay of conventions and sub-constitutional legislation.  As Dicey observed, this was 
the fate of the constitutional rules in Article II of the Constitution of the USA concerning 
the method of electing the President within less than a century of the making of the 
Constitution.62 
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Despite differences between constitutions, and between types of provision within 
each constitution, diverse jurisdictions have shown considerable consistency in their 
selection of principles to guide the interpretation of constitutional instruments.  First, 
constitutions are to be interpreted with the aid of their preambles, which are usually 
treated as forming an integral part of them.63  Secondly, a democratic constitution must 
be interpreted to “foster, develop and enrich”, rather than undermine, democratic 
institutions.64  In particular, interpreters should give scope for a self-governing entity to 
make its own decisions, including decisions about the terms on which democratic 
institutions operate, subject to limits imposed by the constitution.65  Thirdly, 
constitutions are not to be interpreted with mechanical literalness.  Interpreters must 
take account of the context, ultimate object, and textual setting of a provision, 66 bearing 
in mind that “the question is not what may be supposed to have been intended [by the 
framers], but what has been said”.67  Fourthly, according to at least some judges, 
constitutions are not to be interpreted as permitting institutions, including legislatures, 
to act in a way which “offends what I may call the social conscience of a sovereign 
democratic republic”, because law must be regarded by ordinary people as “reasonable, 
just and fair”.68  
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Nevertheless, these principles must be qualified by the recognition of differences 
between constitutions.  We must also take account of the difference between different 
kinds of constitutional provisions.  Once we understand that any constitutional 
document is likely to be an amalgam of different kinds of provisions, we can see why at 
least some of those provisions might have to be read in a different way from primary 
rules aimed at citizens.  No single interpretative technique is appropriate for all 
provisions.  In addition, we need to recognise that the line between constitutions and 
constitutional legislation is soft, not hard.  Similar techniques may have to be applied to 
both.  A good interpreter will choose a technique suited to the provision and the 
circumstances of the case, to give the best chance of leading to a decision which is both 
legally acceptable and practically workable.  The choice of interpretative techniques 
depends partly on factors outside the text.69   
For example, the natural process of enriching the text in response to disputes may 
result in there being less and less need to invoke the “ordinary meaning” principle.  
Again, the “mischief” rule requires us to read the provisions in the light of the problem 
to which they were a response.  Constitutional provisions establishing the state and its 
main institutions will often not be a response to a particular mischief.  A state’s 
institutional design is more likely to reflect a political theory and idea of good 
government, as in the USA., or to be a result of gradual accretion, as in the UK, than to 
be a reaction to an identifiable problem.  On the other hand, problems arising in the pre-
constitutional period may have directly influenced the choice of political theory, and so 
have indirectly affected the distribution of responsibilities between institutions, the 
powers allocated to each institution, their relationships with each other, their powers, 
and forms of accountability.  This was true of West Germany and Japan after World 
War II, South Africa after apartheid, and Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 1992-95 war.  
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It would be perverse not to consider the social and political evils of Nazism, apartheid, 
and irredentist “ethnic cleansing” when interpreting such provisions in (respectively) 
Germany’s Grundgesetz, South Africa’s 1996 Constitution, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s 1995 Constitution.  This applies even more strongly to amendments to 
the constitution: constitutional amendments in the USA. regarding the post-bellum 
settlement, and conventions in the United Kingdom relating to the introduction of 
devolution, show that one can sometimes identify recent or current problems as the 
“mischief” which generates a new constitutional law or understanding. 
4. A case study 
To illustrate the complexity and indeterminacy of all this, let us examine a case 
from Northern Ireland of undeniably constitutional significance.  Robinson v. Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland70 concerned the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which devolved 
executive and legislative powers in respect of certain matters in Northern Ireland from 
Westminster and Whitehall to Belfast.   The Act established a directly elected Legislative 
Assembly and an executive led by a First Minister and Deputy First Minister.  Section 
16(1) and (8) provided: 
(1) Each Assembly shall, within a period of six weeks beginning with its 
first meeting, elect from among its members the First Minister and the 
deputy First Minister. 
    … 
(8) Where the offices of the First Minister and the deputy First Minister 
become vacant at any time an election shall be held under this section to 
fill the vacancies within a period of six weeks beginning with this time. 
They had to be elected as joint candidates by a majority of the members of the 
Legislative Assembly, and that majority had to include majorities of both the designated 
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Unionist members and the designated Nationalist members voting.71 Section 32(3) 
provides, “If the period [of six weeks] ends without a First Minister and a Deputy First 
Minister having been elected, the Secretary of State shall propose a date for the poll for 
the election of the next Assembly.” 
In July 2001 the First Minister resigned.  After several periods of suspension 
starting in August 2001, devolved government was restored on 23 September 2001.  It 
then became necessary for the Assembly to elect a new First Minister and Deputy First 
Minister within six weeks.  This proved impossible, because a majority of the 
designated Unionist members did not support the candidates, Mr David Trimble 
(Unionist) and Mr Mark Durkan (Nationalist).  In November 2001 the Alliance Party, a 
cross-community party not previously linked to either the Unionist or the Nationalist 
caucus, agreed to re-designate themselves as Unionists so that their members could 
help to provide a majority among designated Unionist members.  On 6 November, 
outside the six-week period, Mr Trimble and Mr Murkan were elected.  Members of the 
Alliance Party then disassociated themselves once more from the Unionist caucus.  The 
Secretary of State thereupon exercised his function of setting a date for the election in 
accordance to his statutory duty by ordering that the next election should take place on 
the date when it would have been held in any case under section 31(2) of the Act (1st 
May 2003). 
A leading Unionist challenged the validity of this election.  He argued that section 
16 empowered the Assembly to elect a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister within 
six weeks of the vacancy, and not otherwise.  When six weeks had passed without an 
election, the Assembly lacked competence to elect them, and the Secretary of State was 
obligated under section 32(3) to name a date for elections to a new Assembly.  The 
claimant relied on the ordinary meaning of the words of the Act.  However, the claim 
was rejected by Kerr J. (as he then was) at first instance, by a majority of the Court of 
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Appeal of Northern Ireland, and by a majority of the House of Lords (Lords Bingham, 
Hoffmann and Millett; Lord Hutton and Lord Hobhouse dissented). 
The case turned on the correct approach to interpreting the statute.  Literal 
interpretation played a limited role, partly because it was not clear what the literal 
meaning was, and partly because any “ordinary” meaning of the provisions led to 
results which at least some Law Lords found absurd.  Lord Bingham said that, as the 
Act was in effect a constitution for Northern Ireland, it “should, consistently with the 
language used, be interpreted generously and purposively, bearing in mind the values 
which the constitutional provisions are intended to embody.”72  What, then, were those 
values and purposes? 
“The 1998 Act ... was passed to implement the Belfast Agreement, 
which was itself reached, after much travail, in an attempt to end 
decades of bloodshed and centuries of antagonism. The solution was 
seen to lie in participation by the unionist and nationalist communities 
in shared political institutions…If these shared institutions were to 
deliver the benefits which their progenitors intended, they had to have 
time to operate and take root.”73 
Constitutions cannot take account of every eventuality.  Often 
“matters of potentially great importance are left to the judgment either 
of political leaders (whether and when to seek a dissolution, for 
instance) or, even if to a diminished extent, of the crown (whether to 
grant a dissolution). Where constitutional arrangements retain scope for 
the exercise of political judgment they permit a flexible response to 
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differing and unpredictable events in a way which the application of 
strict rules would preclude.”74 
Knowing that the purpose of the Act as a whole was to achieve peace through power-
sharing thus did not resolve the problem of deciding what to do when arrangements for 
establishing power-sharing broke down.  Would the ordinary meaning of the legislation 
deal with the issue?  The Assembly’s duty to elect a First Minister and Deputy First 
Minister within six weeks seemed mandatory rather than directory.75 Yet there was 
authority for asking two separate questions.  First, did the legislature intend the person 
making the determination to comply with the time provision?  All the Law Lords 
thought it plain that Parliament had intended the Assembly to comply with the time 
limit.  It was obligatory, not discretionary.  Secondly, did the legislature intend that 
failing to meet the deadline would deprive the Assembly of jurisdiction, and render any 
subsequent election null and void?76 
These questions required judges to seek out the “intention of the legislature”.  But, 
as noted earlier, that is an artificial construct; the judge has to decide what intention 
should be imputed to the legislature.  This is demonstrably true of sections 16, 31 and 32 
of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.  The political and legal consequences of the situation 
facing the House of Lords in Robinson had not been thought through in any detail 
during the legislative process.  There had been no time.  The Bill implemented the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement of Good Friday, 1998.  Introduced to the Commons on 15 July, it 
went through all its Commons stages by 31 July.  Second Reading in the Lords was on 5 
October, after the summer recess.  There was a five-day Committee Stage and a three-
day Report Stage, most of which were occupied with Government amendments, 
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necessitated by the fact that the Bill had been drafted in a hurry and new problems were 
constantly being spotted.  Its Third Reading in the Lords was on 17 November; the 
Commons accepted Lords’ amendments on 18 November; royal assent followed on 19 
November, immediately before Parliament was prorogued at the end of its 1997-98 
session.  Furthermore, debate in both Houses was characterised by disagreement 
between political sceptics and optimists over the peace process, concern about the 
rushed legislative procedure, and frustration that so many of the Bill’s details could not 
be amended because of the need to give effect to the Good Friday agreement.  The 
process did not allow careful scrutiny of the Bill’s technical details, let alone any 
attempt to anticipate and cater for all political contingencies that might arise under the 
new power-sharing agreement.  As a result, parliamentarians had no opportunity to 
turn their minds to the issue in Robinson.  Had they done so, it is impossible to say what 
consensus, if any, would have emerged.77 Their Lordships in Robinson were, therefore, 
seeking a legislative intention which was imaginary rather than real, constructive rather 
than actual, objective rather than subjective. 
Lord Bingham thought that it would have been surprising had Parliament 
intended that after the end of the six weeks the Assembly would have no power to act, 
and the Secretary of State would immediately have to start the process of dissolving the 
assembly and setting a date for a new election.  First, “…in the context of section 16(1), 
… little more than seven weeks would have elapsed since the last poll (section 31(4)) 
and there could be no assurance that a further poll would procure a different result”.  
Secondly, it “would have precluded the possibility of negotiation and compromise to 
find a political solution to an essentially political problem, contrary (as I would suggest) 
to British political tradition”.  Thirdly, it “would have deprived the Secretary of State, 
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acting as the non-partisan guardian of this constitutional settlement, of any opportunity 
to wait, even briefly, for a solution to the problem to emerge”.78 
Indeed, the Act had not expressly required the Secretary of State to start to 
dissolve the assembly after six weeks, nor had it imposed an absolute limit on the 
period during which the Assembly could make an election.  Lord Hoffmann noted that 
even the Assembly’s power to elect a First and a Deputy First Minister within six weeks 
was not expressly set out in the Act.  Instead, it fell to be implied, because section 16(1) 
and (8) had clearly been drafted on the assumption that the Assembly would have that 
power.  “So there is no reason why it should not continue for as long as the Assembly 
remains in being and there is a vacancy.”79 
From a purposive viewpoint, Lord Hoffmann pointed out that to treat the six-
week period as allowing no leeway would have contradicted the most basic purpose of 
the Belfast Agreement—  
“namely to create the most favourable constitutional environment for 
cross-community government. This must have been foreseen as 
requiring the flexibility which could allow scope for political judgment 
in dealing with the deadlocks and crises which were bound to occur…. 
The long title of the Act is ‘to make new provision for the government 
of Northern Ireland for the purpose of implementing the agreement 
reached at multi-party talks on Northern Ireland …’. According to 
established principles of interpretation, the Act must be construed 
against the background of the political situation in Northern Ireland 
and the principles laid down by the Belfast Agreement for a new start. 
These facts and documents form part of the admissible background for 
the construction of the Act just as much as the Revolution, the 
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Convention and the Federalist Papers are the background to construing 
the Constitution of the United States.”80 
For the majority, then, what might be thought of as a literal, or ordinary meaning, 
interpretation would have produced a result which, in the context of the Belfast 
Agreement, would have been absurd.  Lord Hutton (a former Lord Chief Justice of 
Northern Ireland), with whom Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough agreed, dissented.  
Lord Hutton took a more literal approach than the majority, but still relied on what he 
judged to be absurdity of consequences:  
“Where a statute gives power to a statutory body to perform a certain 
act within a specified period the normal rule is that the body has no 
power to perform that act outside the period, and I see nothing in the 
provisions of the Act pointing to a different conclusion…. 
“…if the respondents’ argument be correct it would result in unusual 
consequences which were never intended by Parliament.  If the 
Assembly does not elect a First Minister and deputy First Minister 
within the six weeks’ period and the Secretary of State then proposes a 
date for the poll and an Order in Council fixes that date, on the 
respondents’ argument the Assembly could elect a First Minister and 
deputy First Minister the day before its dissolution.  I do not think that 
Parliament intended the Assembly to have such a power….  
“What has happened in this case, where the Secretary of State has fixed 
the date as being the date when a poll would have taken place under 
section 31 on the normal expiration of the life of the Assembly, appears 
to be a procedure which is contrived and artificial, particularly as the 
side note to section 32 refers to ‘Extraordinary elections’ but the 
Secretary of State has proposed the date on which an ordinary election 
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for the Assembly would take place under section 31.  Moreover on the 
respondents' argument if the Assembly failed under section 16(1) to 
elect a First Minister and deputy First Minister within six weeks of its 
first meeting, the Secretary of State would be entitled in some 
circumstances to propose a date more than three years beyond the 
expiration of the six weeks’ period.  I do not think that Parliament 
intended that section 32(3) could operate in that way and that the 
Secretary of State should have such a power.”81 
This shows that neither a search for the ordinary meaning of the provisions nor 
inquiring into legislative intention can produce a definitive answer in hard cases.  The 
meaning of even apparently simple provisions can lead to irreconcilable differences.82 
Legislative intention in relation to an unforeseen problem is, and should be, merely a 
veneer of constitutional theory applied over a search for a sensible, workable result in 
today’s circumstances.  It can be an area of profound disagreement among judges, 
rather than an area of consensus among legislators.  Both majority and dissenting Law 
Lords in Robinson thought that they correctly understood what Parliament must have, 
or could not have, intended.    
Deciding when to employ the proviso to the “golden rule”, displacing the 
ordinary meaning of a provision, is equally problematical.  In order to decide whether 
provisions produce absurd or arbitrary results, bringing the principle of legality into 
play, one has to consider the social and political context in which they were enacted.  It 
may also depend on whether one is prepared to move from an ordinary meaning 
whenever it seems ill-suited to achieving the imputed purpose, or only when no 
reasonable justification can be found for the outcome if one applies the ordinary 
meaning.  In Robinson, Lord Hoffmann adopted the first approach, and Lord Hutton the 
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second.  Both justified their arguments by reference to different conceptions of the 
proper, constitutional role of courts when interpreting constitutional provisions, and 
each generated results that adherents of the other approach regarded as absurd or 
arbitrary. 
5. Conclusion 
The implication of this is that the search for purpose in constitutional provisions has to 
take account of purpose at a high level of generality (as Lord Bingham said, bringing 
peace to Northern Ireland through political power-sharing) as well as, or in preference 
to, concrete purposes of particular provisions.  It cannot be an inquiry into the actual 
thoughts, expectations or purposes of legislators, and the search for a literal or ordinary 
meaning of the text cannot ignore the context of the legislation, including the needs and 
expectations of those who have to make the system work.  Language used by the 
drafters of legislation in the past and attempts to identify their historical purposes 
should not be allowed to preclude a sensible outcome to today’s problems.  This, 
however, is not restricted to constitutional legislation.  It applies to all legislation, and 
still more important when the legislation has constitutional status; issues are likely to be 
of greater national significance, and it is likely to be more difficult to achieve consensus 
on how new legislation is to be framed than it is to construct a parliamentary majority 
for amending ordinary legislation.  The “golden rule” is particularly important in 
relation to legislation with constitutional significance, but is applicable generally to 
allow courts to produce sensible results when applying any legislation. 
 
